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DEFINING DISABLED: A STUDY OF THE ADA
AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008 IN ELIMINATING
THE CONSIDERATION OF CERTAIN MITIGATING
MEASURES
John W. Leonard*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1999, the Supreme Court decided the case Sutton v. United Air Lines,
Inc.1 During oral arguments, Justice Scalia succinctly captured the issue
presented for review by questioning:
I cannot read without reading glasses, and I would not be able to
function in this job or in any job I've ever had [without them]....
Now, there are a lot of Americans like that whose job requires
reading, maybe 100 million . . . Are they all covered by the
Americans with Disabilities Act?2
Thus, the Court was asked to answer whether any mitigating measures
(eyeglasses, in this particular case3) should be considered when determining
if a person is disabled under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).4 In
affirming the dismissal of Sutton's discrimination claim against United Air
Lines (United), and in subsequent cases, the Court concluded that such
* J.D. Candidate, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, May
2010; B.A. University of Richmond, May 2002. The author would like to thank
Administrative Judge Richard Schneider for his assistance bringing this article to life, and
Professor of Law, George P. Smith, II, for all of the work he has done, and continues to
do, for The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy. The author also would like
to thank the entire Volume XXVI team for their dedication, the previous Executive Board
for their guidance, and his fiancee, Heidi, and family for their complete support.
1. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
2. Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S.
471 (1999) (No. 97-1943).
3. For an exhaustive list of auxiliary aids and other forms of assistance considered
mitigating measures, see infra Part IV.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006).
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measures should be taken into account. 5  This interpretation, which
effectively removed persons using mitigating measures from the definition
of disabled, led some to conclude that the ADA's protected class was
decreased.6
Since Sutton, Congress has revisited the issue of whether a person should
be considered inclusive or exclusive of mitigating measures, resulting in the
passage of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADA Amendments Act) in
the 110th Congress.7 Among other provisions, the law effectively overturns
the Supreme Court's decision in Sutton, and requires that courts and
employers ignore mitigating measures when deciding if a person is legally
8disabled. As explicitly stated in the Act, its purpose is "to carry out the
ADA's objectives . . . by reinstating a broad scope of protection to be
available under the ADA."9
The purpose of this Note is to explore the legislative history of the ADA's
employment provisions and subsequent Supreme Court interpretations, as
found in Sutton and its companion cases, to determine how the issue of
mitigating measures has evolved. These topics will be covered in the first
two sections of the Note. The third section introduces the ADA
Amendments Act and explores how Congress has approached overturning
the Supreme Court's interpretation. Finally, this Note will discuss the
possible impact of the new law governing the mitigating measures issue.
These ramifications include the expansion of a protected class, a probable
increase in initial litigation under the ADA, and possible subtle employer
adjustments in the practice of hiring and firing disabled persons to alleviate
the increased risk of potential liability.l
0
5. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475. See also Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527
U.S. 516 (1999); Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
6. One recent estimate placed the post-Sutton protected class of disabled individuals
under the ADA around 13.5 million Americans, approximately thirty million less than the
original forty-three million that Congress sought to protect when enacting the ADA in
1990. Ruth Colker, The Mythic 43 Million Americans with Disabilities, 49 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 1, 1 (2007). See also infra Part V.
7. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553-56
(2008).
8. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2(b)(2).
9. Id. at § 2(b)(1).
10. In discussing the potential for employer adjustments as a ramification of the
ADA Amendments Act, the author has used evidence of employment trends following
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II. TITLE I OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990: OVERVIEW
AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A. Historical Background
President George H.W. Bush signed the ADA into law on July 26, 1990.11
This "comprehensive piece of civil rights legislation" sought to prohibit
employment discrimination with regard to private employers on the basis of
disability. 12 However, this was not Congress' first endeavor to provide a
prohibition against such discrimination. The ADA "incorporates many of
the standards of discrimination set out in regulations implementing ... the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 " 13 (Rehabilitation Act14), a predecessor law
prohibiting discrimination based on disability within the public sector.'
5
Whereas the Rehabilitation Act prohibits disability discrimination "on the
part of the federal government, federal contractors, and institutions receiving
federal funds," the ADA "extend[s] to private employers, private educational
16institutions, and private businesses and service providers." This extension
to the private sector is of particular importance to the topics discussed in this
Note.
As "[t]he employment title of the ADA [only] protects 'qualified persons
with disabilities,"' it is important to note how the law differs from other
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, a similar civil rights enactment that overturned Supreme
Court interpretation allowing for more discrimination suits to be brought against private
employers. See infra Part V. See also Paul Oyer & Scott Schaefer, The Unintended
Consequences of the '91 Civil Rights Act, REG., Summer 2003, at 42.
11. Chai R. Feldblum, The Americans with Disabilities Act Definition of Disability,
7 LAB. LAW. 11, 11 (1991).
12. Id.
13. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11) at 23 (1990).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (2006).
15. See 29 U.S.C. § 791(b) (2006) (requiring executive branch agencies to adopt
affirmative action plans for the hiring of persons with disabilities); 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)
(2006) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability by any recipient of federal
funding).
16. Feldblum, supra note 11, at 11. See also 29 U.S.C. §§ 791(b), 794(a) (2006).
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employment discrimination statutes. 7 For an individual to be covered under
the provisions of the ADA, he must first qualify under the definitions of the
Act as a disabled person.18 Rather than other bases for discrimination, such
as race, gender, or national origin, a plaintiff in a disability discrimination
suit bears the initial burden of proving that he is in fact disabled before the
ADA protections even apply. This initial burden is jurisdictional. A
successful plaintiff must gain standing to pursue a discrimination suit on the
20
merits. Therefore, the language used in the ADA that defines the term
"disabled" becomes of utmost importance. Without it, there would be no
21protected class of individuals.
In defining the term "disabled", the ADA incorporates "the same
definition which Congress adopted to define a 'person with handicap' for
purposes of [the employment provisions] of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973. "22 There are three possible ways for an individual to be covered under
the definition of disability. 23 First, the person may show that he has "a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
17. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791(b), 794(a) (2006).
18. For purposes of the ADA, "[t]he term 'disability' means, with respect to an
individual-(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of
the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or (C) being
regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006). See also infra
Part II.
19. Lisa Eichorn, Applying the ADA to Mitigating Measures Cases: A Choice of
Statutory Evils, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1071, 1082-83 (1999). "While an African-American
man bringing a race discrimination suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
need not prove his racial status, the ADA plaintiff is forced to prove a disability ...
before a court can even consider whether a defendant discriminated because of a
disability." Id. (internal citations omitted).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Feldblum, supra note 11, at 11. While the original definition included in the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 "was [deemed] too narrow to deal with the range of
discriminatory practices in housing, education, and health care programs ... Congress..
• amended the definition in 1974," and that definition was ultimately used for the ADA
employment provisions. Id. at 12.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006).
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major life activities of such individual. 24  Second, a person may show "a
record of such an impairment. ' 25 And, third, the individual may claim to be
"regarded as having such an impairment. ' 26 As the second and third prongs
incorporate much of the definition found in the first, this discussion need not
stray beyond "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more of the major life activities of such individual. 2 7 Furthermore, an
individual will gain standing and be afforded coverage under the law by
successfully proving any of the three definitions of "disabled. '2 8 Then, upon
a successful showing on the merits, the individual will have redress for
employment discrimination based on the disability.
29
While the ADA provides three ways in which a person may be considered
disabled under the statute, missing from the enacted text was sufficient
guidance on what is meant by "major life activities" and "substantially
limits." 30  Specifically, the text of the ADA, in similar fashion to the
Rehabilitation Act as first implemented, was silent in regards to any
consideration of mitigating measures. 31  The ADA made no mention of
whether a person was to be considered with or without such measures when
viewed as "substantially limited" in a "major life activity." 32 As Congress
24. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
28. See Eichom, supra note 19, at 1082-83 (discussing the importance of first
demonstrating that one is legally disabled so that they may be within the protected class).
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006) (inferring that an individual must first be within
the disabled definition before having any redress for discrimination). See also Eichom,
supra note 19, at 1082-83.
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2006) (leaving the terms that are included within
the definition of disabled without definitions themselves). The ADA did, however,
require that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission promulgate regulations in
order to fully implement the employment discrimination section of the Act. 42 U.S.C. §
12116 (2006).
31. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 701 (2006) with 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 12102.
2009
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has since touched upon,33 and as the legislative history of the ADA
demonstrates,34 Congressional silence on this matter was not to be construed
as including mitigating measures during the determination of a legal
disability. The Supreme Court, however, adopted the opposite
interpretation. 
35
B. Legislative History
The House of Representatives' committee reports for the original ADA
provide a prime resource for determining whether Congress intended to
include or exclude mitigating measures. After stating that "[i]t is not
possible to include in the legislation a list of all the specific conditions,
diseases, or infections that would constitute physical or mental
impairments,"37 the House Committee on Education and Labor went on to
state that:
Whether a person has a disability should be assessed without
regard to the availability of mitigating measures, such as
reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids. For example, a
person who is hard of hearing is substantially limited in the major
life activity of hearing, even though the loss may be corrected
through the use of a hearing aid. Likewise, persons with
impairments, such as epilepsy or diabetes, which substantially
limit a major life activity are covered under the first prong of the
definition of disability, even if the effects of the impairment are
controlled by medication.
38
33. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553-56
(2008).
34. See infra Part ll.B.
35. See generally Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (holding that
eyeglasses should be considered when deciding whether a person is legally disabled);
Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999) (holding that medication
should be considered when deciding whether a person is legally disabled); Albertson's,
Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999) (inferring that the body's own adaptation should
be considered when deciding whether a person is legally disabled). See also infra Part
Il.A, B.
36. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 51 (1990).
37. Id. at 52.
38. Id.
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Furthermore, the House Committee on the Judiciary stated an equivalent
interpretation upon approving the ADA.3 9 The Committee expressed that
"[t]he impairment should be assessed without considering whether
mitigating measures, such as auxiliary aids or reasonable accommodations,
would result in a less-than-substantial limitation. For example . . . even if
the hearing loss is corrected by the use of a hearing aid.' 4  Thus, before
enacting the ADA, both committees in the House of Representatives agreed
that mitigating measures would not be taken into account.
4 1
Likewise, the Senate concurred that mitigating measures should not be
considered.42 In its report on the ADA, the Senate Committee on Labor and
Human Resources described its understanding of the proposed definition of
disabled, particularly with regard to an individual experiencing a
"'substantial limitation of one or more major life activities. ' ' 43  The
Committee explained:
A person who can walk for 10 miles continuously is not
substantially limited in walking merely because on the eleventh
mile, he or she begins to experience pain because most people
would not be able to walk eleven miles without experiencing some
discomfort. Moreover, whether a person has a disability should be
assessed without regard to the availability of mitigating measures,
such as reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids.
44
Throughout the legislative process, therefore, neither the House of
Representatives nor the Senate appear to have advocated for the inclusion of
mitigating measures.
The report generated by the House of Representatives and the Senate
conference committee further demonstrates that there was no difference in
how the two chambers viewed the issue.45 Neither chamber disagreed on the
39. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(Ili), at 28-29 (1990).
40. Id.
41. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 52; H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 28-29.
42. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23(1989).
43. Id. at 22.
44. Id. at 23. See also id. at 24 (suggesting that "persons with medical conditions
that are under control, and that therefore do not currently limit major life activities,"
would also be covered under the third prong of the disability definition).
45. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 101-596 (1990).
2009
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exclusion of mitigating measures; rather, the conference report only resolves
other issues that were of concern among the legislators at the time.46 Such
disputes centered on the powers to enforce the Act, regulatory functions of
the several agencies, and other matters not related to employment
discrimination or concerning the definition of disability.
47
Therefore, upon passing the ADA, Congress believed that its intent was
clear that mitigating measures would not be considered. Unfortunately, the
text of the ADA did not specifically address the issue. 48 Instead, such an
interpretative question was left to the courts to determine in the years
subsequent to the law's enactment.
111. INTERPRETING "DISABLED": THE SUPREME COURT INCLUDES
CONSIDERATION OF MITIGATING MEASURES
A. Mitigating Myopic Vision: The Sutton Decision
When deciding if an individual is disabled within the meaning of the
ADA, the question of whether courts and employers need to consider
mitigating measures was addressed in the 1999 decision Sutton v. United Air
Lines, Inc.49 Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor concluded "that
disability under the Act is to be determined with reference to corrective
measures," meaning that a person with eyeglasses should be evaluated with
the glasses, rather than without.
50
In Sutton, twin sisters were denied positions with United as commercial
pilots. 51 The women "met [United's] basic age, education, experience, and
Federal Aviation Administration certification qualifications. However,
46. Id.
47. See generally id. (discussing, at length, the other titles and sections of the ADA,
and not mentioning the issue of mitigating measures within the relatively brief portion on
employment).
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2006) (leaving the terms that are included within
the definition of disabled without definitions themselves).
49. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 471, 475 (1999).
50. Id. at 488.
51. Id. at 475-76.
52. Id.
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both women had "severe myopia," and, consequently, their "uncorrected
visual acuity [was] 20/200 or worse in [the] right eye and 20/400 or worse in
[the] left eye . . . . Upon learning of the vision impairment, United
cancelled their interviews, flight simulation tests, and did not offer a position
to either candidate.54 While each woman experienced 20/20 vision or better
when wearing corrective eyeglasses, both fell short of United's minimum
vision requirement of "uncorrected visual acuity of 20/100 or better."
55
The two sisters filed suit in United States District Court, alleging
discrimination based upon disability in violation of the ADA. 56 The District
Court "dismissed [the] complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. 57 The District Court determined that the sisters
"were not actually substantially limited in any major life activity and thus
had not stated a claim that they were disabled within the meaning of the
ADA. '' 8 In reaching its conclusion, the court considered the plaintiffs' use
of mitigating measures, which "could fully correct their visual
impairments." 59 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, placing it in
conflict with other circuits that had considered the same question.60  The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflicting interpretations.
6 1
53. Id. at 475.
54. Id. at 476.
55. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475-76.
56. Id. at 476.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 156 F.3d 321 (2nd Cir.
1998) (disregarding the use of mitigating measures); Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149
F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 1998) (disregarding the use of mitigating measures); Matczak v.
Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933 (3rd Cir. 1997) (disregarding the use of
mitigating measures); Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854 (1st Cir. 1998)
(disregarding the use of mitigating measures); Washington v. HCA Health Servs. of
Texas, Inc., 152 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 1998) (disregarding the use of mitigating measures).
See also Sutton, 527 U.S. at 477.
61. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 477.
2009
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In affirming the Circuit Court's decision, the Supreme Court relied upon
"[t]hree separate provisions of the ADA, read in concert."6z First, the Court
considered the ADA's definition of "disability," in which "the phrase
'substantially limits' appears . . . in the present indicative verb form ...
requiring that a person be presently-not potentially or hypothetically-
substantially limited in order to demonstrate a disability."63 Accordingly,
"[a] person whose physical or mental impairment is corrected by medication
or other measures does not have an impairment that presently" demonstrates
a legal disability.
64
Second, the Court concluded that applying this definition of disabled "is
an individualized inquiry." 65 If such an individualized inquiry excluded
consideration of mitigating measures, "courts and employers [would have]
to speculate about a person's condition. '66 Such speculation would, in the
view of the Court, be "contrary to both the letter and the spirit of the
ADA.'67  In other words, to be a more accurate individual inquiry,
mitigating measures must be included.
Finally, the Court noted that at the time of the ADA's enactment Congress
68determined that forty-three million Americans were disabled. The Court
reasoned that if Congress intended to include within the definition of
disabled those individuals who function in everyday life through the use of
mitigating measures (such as eyeglasses), the number would have been
much greater.69 The lesser number led the Court to conclude that mitigating
measures were to be included. v
62. Id. at 482.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 483.
66. Id.
67. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 484.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See also id. at 494 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (providing "[t]he strongest clues to
Congress' perception of the domain of the [ADA], as I see it, are legislative findings that
'some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities,' ....").
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Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion in Sutton, did not agree with the
Court's rationale, and would have primarily relied upon the legislative
history of the ADA to reach the conclusion that mitigating measures should
not be considered. 71 As he believed, "[t]he Committee Reports on the bill
that became the ADA make it abundantly clear that Congress intended the
ADA to cover individuals who could perform all of their major life activities
,72
only with the help of ameliorative measures. However, such an approach
to statutory construction was not adopted by a majority of the Court. Rather,
in the view of the seven-member majority, the plain language of the statute
was conclusive and, for the three reasons explained above, the issue resolved
itself. Consequently, there existed no need to employ statutory construction
and consider the ADA's legislative history.73 The holding in Sutton became
the rule of law with regard to mitigating measures. In deciding whether a
person was in fact disabled for the purposes of the ADA, a court would be
required to evaluate the person inclusive of their mitigating measures.
B. Mitigating Through Other Means
In a companion case to Sutton, Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,
74
the Supreme Court held that a person taking medication that controlled high
blood pressure was not substantially limited in a major life activity, and,
thus, not disabled.75 Specifically, the case involved a mechanic for United
Parcel Service (UPS) who was initially "erroneously granted [Department of
Transportation] certification" and hired for the position. 76 One month into
his employment, "a UPS medical supervisor who was reviewing [Murphy's]
medical files discovered the error and requested that [he] have his blood
pressure retested. 7  Upon learning that Murphy's "pressure was measured
71. Id. at 498-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 499.
73. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482. "Justice STEVENS relies on the legislative history of
the ADA for the contrary proposition that individuals should be examined in their
uncorrected state. ... Because we decide that, by its terms, the ADA cannot be read in
this manner, we have no reason to consider the ADA's legislative history." Id
74. Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 519 (1999).
75. Id. at 518-19.
76. Id. at 519-20.
77. Id. at 520.
2009
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at 160/102 and 164/104 .. .[UPS] fired [Murphy] on the belief that his
, . ,,78
blood pressure exceeded the DOT's requirements.
Murphy filed a discrimination suit under the ADA, and the United States
District Court for the District of Kansas granted UPS' Motion for Summary
Judgment on the basis "that when [Murphy] is medicated he is inhibited only
in lifting heavy objects but otherwise functions normally. '7 9 Therefore,
Murphy was "not 'disabled' under the ADA."
80
By relying upon the holding in Sutton, the Supreme Court agreed.8'
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority again, wrote that "[g]iven
[Sutton's] holding, the result in this case is clear." 82 Mitigating measures
included not only eYeglasses and contacts, but also medication for illnesses
or other conditions. 3 Consequently, Murphy's medication to control his
high blood pressure was considered a mitigating measure and he was not
considered legally disabled.84 The Court, however, was not asked to
consider, and refused to answer sua sponte, whether medication itself would
bring an individual within the ADA's definition of disability. 85 For purposes
of the case, it was only significant that Murphy, while medicated, was not
considered disabled under the ADA. Therefore, he lacked standing to bring
suit.
86
However, the largest possible expansion of the requirement to consider
mitigating measures is found in the dicta of the final companion case to
Sutton, Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg.87  In that case, Justice Souter
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Murphy, 527 U.S. at 520.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 521.
83. See, e.g., Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475; Murphy, 527 U.S. at 520-21.
84. Murphy, 527 U.S. at 520.
85. Id. at 521.
86. Id.
87. Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565 (1999).
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delivered the majority opinion, s s which focused primarily on other aspects of
the ADA. 8 9 However, the Court stated that "[t]hough we need not speak to
the issue whether Kirkingburg was an individual with a disability to resolve
this case ... we think it worthwhile to address it briefly in order to correct
three missteps the Ninth Circuit made in its discussion of the matter." 90 In
one such misstep, the "Ninth Circuit was too quick to find a disability."
91
While "Kirkingburg . . . suffer[ed] from amblyopia, an uncorrectable
condition that . . . [caused] 20/200 vision in his left eye and monocular
vision in effect,"92 the Ninth Circuit "appeared to suggest that... a court not
take account of the individual's ability to compensate for the impairment."
93
The Ninth Circuit found that "Kirkingburg's 'brain has developed
subconscious mechanisms for coping with [his] visual impairment and thus
his body compensates for his disability.'
94
In contrast to Sutton, the mitigating measure contemplated by the Court in
Kirkingburg was the body's own ability to compensate over time and adjust
to vision impairment.95  The Court found "no principled basis for
distinguishing between measures undertaken with artificial aids, like
medication and devices, and measures undertaken, whether consciously or
not, with the body's own systems." 96 Thus, the door was opened to a much
broader definition of mitigating measures in the future, including the body's
own adaptation to an otherwise disabling condition.
88. Id. at 557.
89. "Petitioners primary contention is that even if Kirkingburg was disabled, he was
not a 'qualified' individual with a disability," rather than being an individual without any
disability whatsoever. Id. at 567.
90. Id. at 562.
91. Id. at 564.
92. Id. at 559.
93. Alberton's, Inc., 527 U.S. at 565.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 565-66.
96. Id.
2009
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For nearly a decade, the law in this area remained unchanged. With the
Supreme Court's interpretation controlling,97 the 9protected class of
individuals under the ADA was effectively narrowed. Only recently has
Congress revisited the issue and restored its legislative intent through the
enactment of the ADA Amendments Act.
IV. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE: THE EXCLUSION OF MITIGATING
MEASURES
A. Legislative Action in the 1Oth Congress
In September 2006, Representatives Hoyer (MD-5) and Sensenbrenner
(Wl-5) introduced what would later be named the ADA Amendments Act in
the House of Representatives. 99 The bill, "which ultimately garnered over
240 cosponsors," was, however, "seen by many as extending the protections
of the ADA beyond those that Congress originally intended to provide." 10 0
Eventually, a compromise was achieved, and during the ensuing committee
hearings, numerous witnesses testified regarding the need to restore
legislative intent. 10 1 After being "reported out of the Education and Labor
97. For further information on the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, see Diane L. Kimberlin & Linda Ottinger Headley, ADA Overview
and Update: What Has the Supreme Court Done to Disability Law?, 19 REv. LITIG. 579,
586-91 (2000).
98. See, e.g., Orr v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 297 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 2002) (rejecting
diabetes as a disability when controlled by insulin); Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298 (2d
Cir. 1999) (rejecting asthma as a disability due to the use of inhalers and other
medication); Didier v. Schwan Food Co., 465 F.3d 838 (8th Cir. 2006) (compensating
through the use of the left hand while the right hand has suffered an injury precludes
being disabled under the ADA); Walton v. U.S. Marshals Service, 492 F.3d 998 (9th Cir.
2006) (lacking the ability to localize sound not considered a disability when the body is
able to compensate through visual localization).
99. 154 CONG. REC. H6,067 (2008).
100. Id.
101. H.R. 3195, The ADA Restoration Act of 2007 Before the H. Comm. On Education
and Labor, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of David K. Fram, Esq., Director, National
Employment Law Institute); "A fair reading of the ADA's legislative history supports the
notion that the law was to be read expansively and that individuals were to be analyzed
[without regard to mitigating measures.]" Id. (statement of Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr.
Professor, University of the District of Columbia); "Before the Supreme Court upset the
applecart, all relevant authorities were nearly unanimous in the view that mitigating
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Committee by a vote of 43-1, and out of the Judiciary Committee by a vote
of 27-0," the bill passed the House of Representatives by an overwhelming
vote of 402 to seventeen on June 25, 2008.102
Following passage by the House, Senators Harkin (D-IA) and Hatch (R-
UT) introduced a similar bill in the Senate. 10 3 Senate passage was quick to
follow, and unanimous consent was reached on September 11, 2008.104
Shortly thereafter, the House of Representatives passed the Senate bill
unchanged, and submitted it to the White House for President George W.
Bush's signature. 10 5 On September 25, 2008, with the President's signature,
the ADA Amendments Act became law.1
0 6
B. The Mechanics of Overturning Supreme Court Interpretation
In substance, the ADA Amendments Act specifically "reject[s] the
requirement enunciated by the Supreme Court in Sutton v. United Air Lines,
Inc. . . . and its companion cases that whether an impairment substantially
limits a major life activity is to be determined with reference to the
ameliorative effects of mitigating measures."' 7 In order to accomplish this
goal, the Act seeks to create a more concrete definition of disability.
Specifically, the definition of disability provided in 42 U.S.C. § 12102 is
modified by section four of the ADA Amendments Act to add certain "rules
measures should not be considered in deciding whether a person has a disability under the
ADA." Id. (statement of Carey L. McClure, Plaintiff, ADA Lawsuit v. General Motors);
"Because I'd adapted so well to living with muscular dystrophy, the court said I wasn't
protected by the ADA." Id. (statement of Andrew J. Imparato, President and CEO,
American Association of People with Disabilities); "Whereas Congress intended the
ADA to tear down the shameful wall of exclusion that had barred people with a wide
range of disabilities from achieving to their full potential, the federal courts have
contorted the law to the point where they have created a new wall." Id.
102. 154 CONG. REC. H6,081 (2008).
103. 154 CONG. REC. S8,348 (2008).
104. Id. at S8,356.
105. 154 CONG. REC. H8,298.
106. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553-56
(2008).
107. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2(b)(2) (emphasis added).
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of construction." ' 08  In applying the new rules of construction, the Act
mandates that "[t]he determination of whether an impairment substantially
limits a major life activity shall be made without regard to ... mitigating
measures," o9 which include:
medication, medical supplies, equipment, or appliances, low vision
devices (which do not include ordinary eyeglasses or contact
lenses), prosthetics including limbs and devices, hearing aids and
cochlear implants or other implantable hearing devices, mobility
devices, or oxygen therapy equipment and supplies; . . . use of
assistive technology; ... reasonable accommodations or auxiliary
aids or services; or ... learned behavioral or adaptive neurological
modifications.11
While Congress was expansive in its inclusion of specific mitigating
measures, it is important to note that ordinary eyeglasses were excluded
from the revised statutory construction.111 Thus, within the Act, "[t]he
ameliorative effects of the mitigating measures of ordinary eyeglasses or
contact lenses shall be considered in determining whether an impairment
substantially limits a major life activity." 112
The ADA Amendments Act became effective on January 1, 2009.113
Presently, courts and employers are required to view individuals without
regard to any mitigating measures when determining whether that individual
is disabled under the law.
114
V. POTENTIAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE ADA AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008
A. Expanded Protected Class and Increased Litigation
The ADA Amendments Act seeks to restore Congress's legislative intent
with regard to the ADA's original coverage for the purposes of employment
108. Id. at § 4(a).
109. Id. (emphasis added).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 8.
114. Id. at § 4(a).
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discrimination.1 15  The Act requires that courts and employers view
individuals without regard to any mitigating measures when evaluating
possible legal disability.116  The primary ramification of this "expanded
definition of 'disability' under the act will [be to] increase the number of
individuals protected by federal law."' 17 Logically, with a broader definition
comes a broader class of covered individuals.
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Sutton, courts have been forced to
narrowly construe the definition of disabled. Consequently, they have
limited the size of the protected class under the law.118 As originally
enacted, the ADA was intended to cover "some 43,000,000 Americans
[who] have one or more physical or mental disabilities."'"19 However, as at
least one study has determined, "the approach chosen by the Court [in Sutton
and other ADA interpretative cases] only results in about 13.5 million
Americans receiving statutory coverage." 120 With the changes included in
the ADA Amendments Act, however, "the range of ADA coverage will
expand significantly."' 121  While the law does not extend to the vast
population of individuals who wear prescription eyeglasses, it will extend to
those individuals who use medication and certain devices to mitigate their
disabling condition. 122
Indicative of the potential for protected class expansion, the American
Heart Association estimates that "[a]bout 73 million people in the United
115. Id.
116. Id. at § 4(a).
117. Lawrence Lorber, Fredric C. Leffler & Samantha Morris, Get Ready to Relearn
the ADA, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 20, 2008, at 26.
118. Colker, supra note 6, at 6-7. "[T]he Court has undermined the ADA's anti-
subordination approach by construing the term 'disability' so narrowly that the statute is
unable to provide meaningful protection to individuals with disabilities who face
employment-related discrimination." Id.
119. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1).
120. Colker, supra note 6, at 7. See also supra Part III.
121. Lorber, supra note 117, at 26.
122. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 4(a).
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States age 20 and older have high blood pressure."'123 Such statistics alone
do not quantify the number of Americans who mitigate their hypertension
with medication or are substantially limited in major life activities due to
their condition. Nevertheless, the potential for an expansion of class
members well beyond the original forty-three million Americans
contemplated by Congress in 1990 remains apparent given that the ADA
Amendments Act "makes clear that impairments that are episodic or in
remission can still be considered a 'disability' . . . ."'24 No doubt, the
number of members in the protected class will continue to increase if other
conditions are added that can be mitigated through medication, such as
asthma and diabetes, and conditions mitigated through devices, such as
hearing aids or prosthetics.
1 25
The expanded protected class of individuals under the ADA leads to the
potential of "an initial uptick in litigation involving the scope of the
expanded 'disability' definition" and other changes provided in the ADA
Amendments Act.1 6 In the years preceding the Sutton decision, including
fiscal years 1997 through 1999, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission received an average of approximately 17,640 charges filed
under the ADA. 12 7  However, post-Sutton, that average dropped to
approximately 15,906 charges per year from 2000 to 2007, never once
reaching the high-water mark of 18,108 claims in 1997.128 The chilling
effect of courts narrowly interpreting the ADA, or stated differently, the
overall decrease in protected class size in the post-Sutton era, may explain
the decrease in charges brought on the basis of disability discrimination. If
true, a reasonable expectation is that the number of charges will increase in
the years following enactment of the ADA Amendments Act, as the law
mandates broad construction of the ADA provisions and increases the
persons covered under the law through the elimination of mitigating measure
123. American Heart Association, High Blood Pressure Statistics, http://www.
americanheart.org/presenter.jhtml?identifier-4621 (last visited Sept. 17, 2009).
124. Lorber, supra note 117, at 27.
125. Id. at 26 (noting that "the range of ADA coverage will expand significantly").
126. Id. at 27.
127. The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) Charges, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ada-charges.html
(last visited Sept. 17, 2009).
128. Id.
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considerations.129 However, as one study has indicated in a separate area of
civil rights law, the ultimate sustainability of increased litigation under the
ADA may not be a long-term trend.1
30
B. Firing Versus Non-Hiring: The Potential Long-Term Impact of the ADA
Revisions
Approximately twenty years ago, "[t]he early 1990s saw a rebirth of
congressional interest in employment discrimination legislation., 131 The
ADA represents one of these congressional enactments, while the Civil
Rights Act of 1991132 represents another. Similar to the goal of the ADA
Amendments Act seventeen years later, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 sought
to revise existing law that the Supreme Court narrowly construed. 133 Two
specific outcomes of the legislation were "changes in the ability of plaintiffs
to use statistical evidence to prove discrimination, and increases in damage
awards available to plaintiffs who prove discriminatory intent on the part of
an employer.' 134 Those in favor "of the legislation argued that . . . the Act
was necessary to open opportunities for women and minorities in fields that
had traditionally been unwelcoming." 135 At least one study has documented
that there was an initial increase in litigation following enactment of this
corrective civil rights legislation. 136 However, the same study concluded
that, "[w]hile the 1991 Civil Rights Act did not have large beneficial or
adverse effects on employment or average wages for protected workers,
employers did change their behavior in subtle ways after its passage. ' '1 37
129. Lorber, supra note 117, at 26-27.
130. Oyer, supra note 10, at 42. See also infra Part V.B.
131. Id.
132. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166 (1991).
133. Oyer, supra note 10, at 43. "A 1989 Court decision, Wards Cove Packing Co.,
Inc. v. Atonio, [490 U.S. 642 (1989),] made it significantly more difficult for plaintiffs to
prove disparate impact." Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 42.
136. Id. at 43.
137. Id.
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Two of these "subtle ways" included "employers with higher susceptibility
to employment discrimination litigation reduced their hiring of protected
workers [and]... employers also shifted their means of dismissing protected
workers toward layoffs and away from individual firings."' 3  Each
behavioral change was made with the purpose of reducing the employer's
potential liability.
1 39
Although the changes enacted by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 differ from
those in the ADA Amendments Act, the effect within the employer
community may be similar. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 allowed for,
among other things, a different means for plaintiffs to argue discrimination
on the merits through the use of disparate impact statistics.140  In an
analogous manner, by eliminating any consideration of mitigating measures
and allowing more disabled persons to have standing to pursue a claim of
discrimination under the ADA, more disability discrimination cases will be
heard on the merits by "remov[ing] the focus from a 'disability' inquiry"
alone. 14 1  As employers once relied upon arguing against jurisdiction
(because a plaintiff utilized a mitigating measure), they are now forced to
argue the merits of discrimination, just as employers were forced to do after
the introduction of statistical evidence following enactment of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991.142
With those similarities in mind, it is not illogical to presume a similar
trend will occur within the realm of disability discrimination as happened in
the wake of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 for minorities and women. That
is to say, employers may a ain subtly adapt their behavior to avoid an
increased risk of litigation. In short, "employers know that far more
lawsuits are brought, and far greater damages awarded, for claims of
138. Oyer, supra note 10, at 47.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 42.
141. Lorber, supra note 117, at 27.
142. Stuart Taylor, Jr., The 1991 Civil Rights Act Has Hurt Its Intended Beneficiaries,
35 NAT'L J. 2665, 2675 (2003) (noting that "new incentives for employers to hire more
minorities and women were apparently overwhelmed by employers' fears of
discriminatory-discharge suits by any of the new hires who might not work out.").
143. Id.
144. Id.
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discrimination in firing than in hiring." 145 For that very reason, employers
may be less likely to hire persons with disabilities, particularly in light of the
increased class size and the requirement that they defend lawsuits on the
merits of discrimination rather than disputing whether a person is in fact
legally disabled. Furthermore, in the years following the passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, "employers also shifted their means of dismissing
protected workers toward layoffs and away from individual firings," as the
latter is more difficult to defend in court than the former. 146 This trend could
also impact working persons with disabilities in the years to come.
While the particular ramifications remain to be seen, there is no doubt that
the ADA Amendments Act will have some impact upon the courts and
employers. 47 In the near future, there will be an increased protected class
size under the ADA, and, probably, an initial increase in litigation. 148 The
long-term effects, however, are much less clear. In light of the impact
following the Civil Rights Act of 1991, it seems possible that employers will
subtly change their hiring and firing practices in order to reduce their
exposure to increased liability.
VI. CONCLUSION
The legislative history of the ADA reveals that Congress intended not to
consider mitigating measures when determining whether a person is legally
disabled. 149  However, such guidance was not included in the ADA as
enacted. 150 As a result, the Supreme Court was left to interpret the statute
and decide whether mitigating measures should be considered. Ultimately,
the Court determined that such measures should be taken into account.' 5' In
reaching its conclusion, the Court found it unnecessary to consider the
145. Id.
146. Oyer, supra note 10, at 47.
147. See Lorber, supra note 117, at 26-27 (discussing the ultimate increased class size
and probable "uptick in litigation.").
148. Id.
149. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485(1), at 51 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11I), at 28-
29 (1990); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23, 24 (1989).
150. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
151. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.
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legislative history of the ADA, finding the text of the statute sufficient to
answer the question. 152
Congress, believing that its intent had been misconstrued by the Supreme
Court, took action to effectively overturn the Court's decision by mandating
that mitigating measures (with the exception of "ordinary eyeglasses or
contact lenses"'1 53) not be considered in any disability determination under
the ADA.' 54 The 1 10th Congress passed and the President signed the ADA
Amendments Act.155  The new law makes clear that the courts and
employers must adopt a standard construction that does not include
mitigating measures when determining whether an individual is considered
disabled under the ADA.156  Consequently, employment law, and
specifically disability law, is entering a new era.
Probable short-term ramifications of the ADA Amendments Act include
an increased class of covered individuals and at least an initial increase in
litigation. 157 Where an aggrieved individual suffering from high blood
pressure was previously not protected under the ADA because of his use of
medication controlling the condition, that individual is now part of the
expanded class mandated by the ADA Amendments Act. 15  With more
people being covered, and the litigation focusing on the merits of the claim
rather than on standing, more people will likely bring suit.
159
In the long-term, however, the ramifications are less clear. Certain trends
within the employer community following enactment of similar civil rights
laws may shed some light on the probabilities of long-term effects in the
wake of the ADA Amendments Act.' Following the Civil Rights Act of
1991, which, like the ADA Amendments Act, created an easier path for
152. Id.
153. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 4(a).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Lorber, supra note 1] 7, at 26-27; see also supra Part V.
158. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 4(a).
159. Lorber, supra note 117, at 27.
160. See supra Part V.B.
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individuals to bring discrimination suits, employers changed their hiring and
... .. . . . 161
firing practices to avoid an increase in iability. Notably, employers that
were more susceptible to liability hired fewer individuals from the protected
classes and, when releasing a protected worker, tended to utilize mass
layoffs rather than individual firings. 162 Similar patterns may occur with
regard to employers and persons with disabilities following the ADA
Amendments Act. As such, employers may be less willing to hire disabled
persons knowing that those individuals now have a greater likelihood of
success in the courts should problems arise within the workplace.
Furthermore, disabled individuals might be grouped into a mass layoff
situation in order for the employer to protect itself against the greater risk of
liability that stems from an individual firing.
In sum, the ADA Amendments Act has altered disability law such that an
individual will be considered without regard to any mitigating measures
(save eyeglasses) when deciding whether the individual is legally disabled.
Congress has restored its intent, created a much broader protected class of
individuals, and shifted the focus in litigation from standing to the merits of
the claim. However, as with at least one previous effort to accomplish
similar objectives, the ADA Amendments Act could have long-term
unintended ramifications. Such ramifications may have the effect of actually
increasing adversity in the private sector for persons with disabilities, as
employers attempt to proactively limit their potential exposure to liability.
161. Oyer, supra note 10, at 43-46. See also supra Part V.
162. Id. at 47.
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